STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AT A CROSSROAD:
UN PEACEKEEPING POLICY

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ABSTRACT

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  The nature of peacekeeping missions has changed. Interstate conflicts no longer prevail as the principal threat to world security. Intrastate conflicts now dominate the global scene. The UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Gahli, proposed several initiatives to strengthen the UN's ability to react to a crisis requiring a peace operation response. Those initiatives are compared against US peace operation policy. The issues that emerge from this examination reflect the current peace operation dilemma facing the UN. This paper argues that the approach proposed by the Secretary-General is unsound, as it carries the UN into an area beyond its core competence. The paper proposes a different strategic approach for the UN, with more focus and effort on preventive measures by the organization and its components.

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Introduction

The United Nations (UN) Security Council authorized as many peacekeeping missions in the five years following the end of the Cold War, as it did during the organization's preceding forty years.[1] There is a significant change in the nature of these new missions. In the past, interstate conflicts prevailed. Peacekeeping missions were established with the concurrence of involved parties to help resolve the ongoing conflict. Today, intrastate conflicts dominate the global scene. Warring factions oppose the introduction of forces to establish peace. Intrastate conflicts create a different set of conditions for peace operations.[2]

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed several initiatives to strengthen the UN's ability to react to a peace operation crisis. This paper examines those initiatives against US peace operations policy. Each represents a prominent approach to this international quandary. The issues that emerge from this examination provide a path to understand the current peace operation dilemma facing the UN.

This article examines that dilemma. It argues that the approach proposed by the Secretary-General is unsound, as it carries the UN into an area in which it is ill-suited to operate, one that extends beyond the UN's core competency. A different strategic approach to peace operations is proposed for the UN, with more focus and effort on preventive measures by the organization and its components. When peace making or enforcement activities become necessary, these should be led by

regional organizations or individual member states.

This approach will impact all parties to the peace operation process; the UN, member states, and regional organizations. The UN must focus on bringing peace back into the peace operation process. Member states and regional organizations must become more engaged in the peace sustainment process, yet remain prepared to execute peace making or enforcement measures when required.

The Secretary-General's Proposals

"An Agenda for Peace," UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report to the Security Council, proposed major changes to the UN's approach on the use of military force in peacekeeping operations. He called for member states to identify what military personnel they were prepared to make available to the UN for peacekeeping operations. Formal stand-by agreements would be established between the Secretariat and the member states to confirm the kind and number of personnel that would be offered to the UN (military and civilian). The Secretary-General asked that arrangements for training of peacekeeping personnel be reviewed and improved.[3]

He also proposed that the Security Council consider using peace enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances, with terms of reference specified in advance. These member state units would be available on call and consist of volunteers for the duty. They would be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and have extensive training. They would be deployed under

the authorization of the Security Council and, as in the case of peacekeeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General.[4] The Secretary-General noted that the UN had no standing stock of equipment to support peacekeeping operations and called for the establishment of a pre-positioned stock of basic peacekeeping equipment. As an alternative, governments could commit to keep stand-by stocks of designated equipment available for the UN. The Secretary-General asked that air and sea-lift needed to support peacekeeping operations be provided to the UN free of cost or at lower than commercial rates by those member states with the capability to deliver the services .[5]

"An Agenda for Peace" also addressed financial support for peacekeeping operations. It called for the immediate establishment of a revolving peacekeeping fund of $50 million, an agreement that one-third of the estimated cost of peacekeeping operations be appropriated by the General Assembly as soon as the Security Council approved the operation, and an acknowledgement by member states that under exceptional cases, it might be necessary for contracts to be placed without competitive bidding.[6] "An Agenda for Peace" reiterated the necessity for all member states to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.

On 3 January 1995, the Secretary-General released a "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace," a report which served as a position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. In his discussion of

peacekeeping, Boutros Boutros-Ghali indicated that problems concerning the availability of troops and equipment were more serious. Even with expanded stand-by arrangements, there is no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation. When the Security Council decided to expand the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda in May 1994, not one of the nineteen governments with stand-by troops agreed to contribute to the mission. The Secretary-General proposed that the United Nations give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force which would act as a strategic deployment reserve for the Security Council when there was an emergency need for peacekeeping troops.[7]

The initiatives proposed by the Secretary-General in his 1992 and 1995 reports were part of his recommendations on how to improve the UN's capacity to maintain peace and security. His initiatives were well-reasoned answers to charges the UN was too slow meeting the challenges of peace operations. The expanded capabilities he proposed addressed these charges and, in the minds of many, made the UN a more relevant player in the international arena. His initiatives were not adopted by the Security Council nor supported by member states. When his initiatives are examined against US peace operation policy, this rejection is better understood. US policy more closely reflects the position of individual UN member states.

US Peace Operations Policy

US peacekeeping policy is taken from three documents:

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Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS), and National Military Strategy of the United States 1995 (NMS). The fundamental thrust of US peacekeeping policy is that while multilateral peace operations are an important part of its strategy, the US must make highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances it will support or participate in them. For each proposed operation, it will analyze requirements and capabilities before voting to support or participate. For those operations where the US considers the employment of its forces, it will use the same assessment criteria and principles that it applies to any decision to employ US forces.[8] When US forces are directed to participate in a major peace enforcement operation likely to involve combat, US guidelines will be to: commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives; plan to achieve those objectives decisively; and reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of US forces to achieve US objectives.[9]

The first criteria every peacekeeping operation must demonstrate to obtain US support is advancement of US interests. The US is committed to reducing the overall costs of UN peacekeeping operations and the percentage it pays for each of those operations. It is working to reform and improve the UN's capability to manage peacekeeping operations. US policy underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of US forces. He has the authority to place US forces

under the operational control of a foreign commander when it serves US security interests, but the greater the anticipated US military role, the less likely the US will agree to have a UN commander exercise operational control over US forces. Last, US policy calls for genuine participation by Congress and the American people in the processes that support US decision-making on new or on-going peace operations.[10]

The focus of US policy is for constraint in approving and participating in peace operations. To better understand this position, it is important to review the growth of UN peace operations. On 31 January 1988, there were five active UN peace operations being conducted in the world. As of 16 December 1994, there were 17 such operations. The number of military and civilian personnel participating in these operations grew from 11,121 to 77,783. Equally as important, the cost of peace operations increased in this same period from $230.4 million to approximately $3.61 billion.[11]

When one compares US policy with the Secretary-General's initiatives, issues emerge. The US does not support the idea of a standing UN army or of earmarking specific military units to participate in UN operations.[12] It does not endorse the proposal for the creation of a UN rapid reaction force.[13] It does not agree with the current method of financing UN peace operations and will not relinquish command of US forces to the UN.[14] The US conditions for operational control of its forces by a UN commander do not generally meet the command arrangement desired

by the UN. The US agrees with initiatives to improve training of personnel participation in UN operations and endorses the enlargement of the revolving peacekeeping reserve fund, although it believes this should be accomplished through voluntary contributions as opposed to assessments.[15] The US has helped the UN create a Situation Center to support peacekeeping. The US supports UN development of a mission planning capability, standard communications and automation architectures, and the development of intelligence sharing protocols. The US has assigned several US military officers to support the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations.[16]

The Military Force Issue

Should the UN have its own military capability that can rapidly deploy to support peace operations? To understand the military dilemma in which the UN finds itself today, it is necessary to look back at the original intent of the UN founders. Abba Eden, the Israeli Foreign Minister from 1966 to 1974 and the Israeli Ambassador to the UN from 1948 to 1959, points out that the original intent of the UN charter was for the UN to be able to enforce its decisions through Article 43. A Military Staff Committee (MSC), composed of members from the five major powers, was to develop a plan for the mobilization of UN forces under the auspices of Article 43. These would be held ready under the command of the Security Council and used to coerce compliance with UN decisions. However, the MSC failed to agree on the need and composition of an enforcement force. A conscious decision

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was taken to avoid any attempt to subject major powers to collective coercion. Negotiations on Article 43 collapsed in 1947. With the demise of Article 43, the UN failed to obtain the special enforcement capability that would have separated it from its predecessor, the League of Nations.[17]

The call for a standing UN force is not a new idea. Torsten Orn, the Swedish Ambassador to the Holy See, writes that the concept of a small standing rapid reaction force at the disposal of the Secretary-General and the Security Council was put forward by the first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, and discussed again in Dag Hammarskjold's days.[18] In 1992, French President Mitterrand proposed the creation of a 1000 man standby force and in 1993, Sir Brian Urqhart, the former Under Secretary-General of the UN for Special Political Affairs, proposed establishing a force of approximately 5000 individual volunteers rather than national contingency forces.[19] In 1994, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van Mierlo, and the Canadian Foreign Minister, Andre Ouellet, both suggested to the 49th General Assembly of the UN that it should consider creating a permanent military force.[20]

The rationale behind these calls for a permanent UN military capability is that the UN needs a force that can immediately respond to an international crisis. Rwanda is cited as an example where a standing UN force might have made the difference in saving thousands of lives. One of the principal criticisms of the UN has always been that it needs too much time to deploy its forces to a crisis.[21] In normal circumstances, the various

stand-by arrangements simply do not function quickly enough, despite the fact that everyone agrees on the necessity for speed and recognizes that an infantry battalion today may be more valuable than an infantry brigade later.[22] The problem with stand-by arrangements is that governments providing national units must agree on the purpose and reason for the use of their forces. As governments ponder this decision, potential tragedies turn into disasters. Even when deployed, stand-by forces remain subject to close scrutiny by their home governments which want a say in operational decisions affecting their soldiers.[23]

Command and control, a highly contentious issue, is a special problem for the UN.   It goes beyond incompatibilities in communications and other equipment that normally exist between forces from different nations. National policies interfere. Few countries are willing to yield authority over their national contingents to a UN-appointed officer. Furthermore, commanders of national units often consult with their governments before implementing any significant or questionable order from a UN commander.[24]

Most countries recognize the weaknesses of stand-by forces, but they do not support the establishment of a permanent UN military capability. Costs for a permanent force are estimated to be as high as $500 million per year. Equipment and logistics are legitimate concerns. However, the greatest obstacle is political.[25] National governments are not willing to give the UN a permanent army of its own. Leaders of the major powers are

reluctant to allow an independent UN military capability, even if it would enable the organization to be more effective.[26] Third world leaders are equally hesitant to provide a capability to the UN that could some day be turned against their countries. The political concern can be effectively summarized, "States guard their sovereignty jealously."[27]

Other arguments against the establishment of a permanent UN force are equally powerful. The UN is not staffed nor organized to command military operations. Gordon Wilson, a retired Royal Navy captain and a consultant in strategic analysis and international relations, points out that the UN lacks the structure to cope effectively with a crisis. He indicates that although the UN has enhanced its Peacekeeping Department with a basic planning cell, this does not give the organization the capability to conduct effective command and control of an operation in a military environment, let alone in a rapidly moving one.[28] The ability to conceptualize and execute a military operation, beyond that of traditional peacekeeping, does not exist at the UN. The structure, training, intelligence, communications and logistics necessary to conduct a military operation are missing. With these shortfalls, the value of a volunteer or stand-by UN military force is questionable. The initiatives proposed by the Secretary-General move the UN into an area where it does not have expertise. Without a significant enlargement of its staff and the creation of an operation center to maintain contact with deployed forces, the UN cannot provide

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the 24 hours-a-day command and control function necessary to run military operations.

The New Conditions and Their Impacts

The nature of peace operations has changed. Traditional peacekeeping developed from principles established in response to the Suez crisis in 1956. Under these principles, peacekeeping is conducted with the consent of the parties to the dispute. It is impartial toward the parties involved, and does not support the use of force, except in self-defense.[29] Peacekeeping in this context is a fairly straight forward operation which the UN has conducted with success over a number of years.

In the post Cold War years, peace operations have taken an enforcement turn. They attempt to compel combatants to cease fighting and seek peace. This has led to their designation as peace enforcement operations. There are profound differences between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

> "Unlike peacekeepers, peace enforcers are often not welcome by one or either side(s). Rather, they are active fighters who must impose a cease-fire that is opposed by one or both combatants; in the process, the neutrality that distinguishes peacekeepers will most likely be lost."[30]

When peace enforcement is the required response, war, not peace, best describes the situation.[31] Lightly armed peacekeepers are not an appropriate choice for a peace enforcement environment. The UN peacekeeping experience in Bosnia during 1993 and 1994 vividly demonstrates the inadequacy of peacekeepers when a cease-fire is opposed by combatants.

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Intrastate conflicts are now the dominant challenge to the UN and the international community. They are not readily resolved by traditional peacekeeping practices. They have unique characteristics which make them more difficult for the UN to handle. Five characteristics stand out:

1) Intrastate conflicts lack clarity. It is difficult to determine who is the aggressor and who is the aggrieved, who is a civilian and who is a combatant. It is equally difficult to determine which group is the legitimate authority in a country.

2) States are failing. The growth of national self-determination and anti-colonial movements led to the explosive emergence of many new states between 1945 and 1993. An increasing number of these new states have failed or are failing. Most never possessed the national elements of power necessary for survival. Competing factions now vie for control in the vacuum left by the state. These failed states become a sizeable burden for UN resources.

3) A history of ethnic, religious or other rivalry make restoring the *status quo ante* extremely difficult. Aspirations of one group directly conflict with control by another, with little or no ground for compromise between the two sides.

4) Internal conflicts pose risks for the UN's impartiality and credibility. The UN must be especially wary of how it becomes involved in a conflict and the nature of its involvement. Each operational decision may give the impression

that one group, faction or leader is favored over another. Impartiality is difficult to maintain. If impartiality is lost, UN credibility becomes jeopardized and affects current and future peace operations.

     5) The complex nature of intrastate conflict requires accurate and reliable intelligence, a product not normally available to the UN.[32]

Amid the complexities of intrastate conflict, there is an effort to expand the parameters within which the UN will conduct peace operations. Many believe the UN has a humanitarian responsibility to intervene in a state when individual human rights are grossly violated or living conditions become intolerable. This intervention should be conducted with or without state consent. This position is founded on moral and ethical considerations, but has a somewhat questionable legal justification. The philosophy is described:

> "What matters today is not only international security in the sense of the Charter but human security in a much broader sense. Ethnic or civil conflicts within a country, denial of human rights, religious fundamentalism, ecological factors and quite simply the continued disparity between rich and poor countries today call for international action as never before."[33]

Supporters argue that since the UN Charter (Chapter VII) allows intervention against a state for enforcement purposes, the same should be true to protect human rights. They question where the line should be drawn in the case of human rights violations and why consent is required where there is clear evidence of human rights abuse.[34] In their opinion, security, as it is

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described in the UN Charter, is as much about the protection of individuals as it is about the defense of the territorial integrity of states. Many proponents of this position argue that the international community's obligation, under the UN Charter, is to protect basic human rights.[35] Inherent in this philosophy is an expanded role for the UN.

> "One might say that we - that the world - have become much more ambitious, in a positive sense, over the years since the UN Charter was conceived and accepted as a set of rules for international behavior with the world community and that the end of the Cold War has made it possible for us to undertake things that we were previously prevented from doing. At the same time, it is obvious that these wider ambitions make many of us demand changes in the Charter or at least make us try to stretch the interpretation of some of its articles to better suit a new global governance."[36]

The complexity of intrastate conflict and the human rights dimension of many missions, require the UN to reconsider its existing peacekeeping principles. The principles of consent and impartiality are not valid for many current missions.[37] The UN guidelines that have been used for over 40 years to frame peace operations need revision.

The new conditions require changes in the UN's approach to peace operations. The UN needs to develop criteria for its involvement in peace operations. It needs to assess proposed missions against this criteria. When it elects to participate in a peace operation, the goal or desired end-state of that operation must be clearly defined for all to understand. Each proposed mission should be processed through this assessment

process.   The UN must make the same highly disciplined choices
about when and under what circumstances it will become involved
in peace operations as member states do when they consider
employing military options.   Peace operations need to become the
option of last resort, not the first option chosen.

The Regional Role

As debate continues to swirl over the pros and cons of UN
peace operations, there is a growing feeling in the international
community that regional organizations need to play a more
significant role in world security.   Regional resolution of a
problem is viewed as an attractive alternative to placing the
issue directly in front of the international community.[38]   To a
degree, this is an effort to pass the problem to another player,
but it also reflects a subtle change in the international
community.

The end of the Cold War changed the focus of the
international political system.   Instead of a global dynamic,
political and security issues became more succinctly defined in
regional and sub-regional terms.   No one state or organization
currently appears capable of managing the post-Cold War period.
The US, which is recognized by all as the sole remaining super
power and the only legitimate entity which can manage this
process, has opted not to become the world's policeman.   Instead,
it has encouraged a lead role for regional organizations in
managing local conflicts.[39]

The US expects regional powers and organizations to carry

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more of the burden of maintaining peace in their regions. Many

regional powers see their involvement in regional arrangements as

a means of enhancing their influence and status. Medium and

small powers believe that collective action on their part can

mitigate their disadvantaged international position. Successes

in regional cooperation, particularly in Southeast Asia and the

South Pacific, have made regionalism more attractive to other

countries. Finally, the interest in security regionalism has

been spurred by the growth and success of economic regionalism.

Regional economic arrangements have become key elements of the

global multilateral economic system. The self-confidence that

economic regional success developed, encourages regional

approaches to security issues.[40]

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter established a role for

regional organizations in settling disputes, but 50 years of UN

history show this option has been rarely used.[41] Regional

organizations are not all created equal and may be limited in the

degree of conflict resolution support they are able to provide.

A regional organization's ability to participate in peace

operations is limited by its overall organizational strength and

its cohesion of purpose.[42]

Michael Barnett, a former Council on Foreign Relations

International Affairs Fellow at the US Mission to the UN, points

out that with the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE)[43], most regional organizations are not capable or

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willing to become militarily involved in peace operations. He indicates that Third World regional organizations are most comfortable limiting their activities to the earliest phases of peace operations. Barnett believes that not only do they view themselves as having an advantage over the UN and other organizations at the earliest stage of the peace operation process, this view is supported by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.[44]

Regional states and organizations generally have an "insider" advantage. They have a greater appreciation of regional factors such as history, culture and religion; they know and have worked with conflict participants; they are not viewed with the same level of suspicion as organizations from outside the region; and they can give greater attention and consideration to the conflict than international organizations with broader, more encompassing missions. Nearly all regional organizations are building measures to increase regional trust and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes.[45] Even if regional organizations are limited to the measures just outlined, their involvement is a positive influence on the process. Regional organizations tend to modify behavior by building shared identities and trust, which encourages peaceful settlement of disputes.[46]

As Barnett points out, there are regional organizations with the resources, the will and the military capability to lead peace operations, if and when they become necessary. NATO's current

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lead in Bosnia is an example of this ability. UN failures in Bosnia, in combination with less than expected outcomes in Somalia, Angola and Rwanda, have dimmed its enthusiasm for the peace operations lead and increased its efforts to find alternative means of handling crisis requiring peace operations.

There is a growing consensus that regional organizations should be the first in and last out in peace processes.[47] There are signs that regional organizations are becoming willing to accept more responsibility in this area. NATO's new Combined Joint Task Forces may be available for out-of-area operations. It would consist of units chosen from various NATO countries, controlled by an already existing headquarters. Partnership for Peace units may also support future peace operations.[48] The willingness of NATO, OSCE and other regional organizations to become involved and take the lead is expected to have several ripple effects. A greater effort is expected on the part of regional organizations to solve their area problems before forwarding them directly to the UN. Regions will commit more time to identifying potential problems before they get out of hand. The greater the sense of responsibility for its own area, the more likely the region will be to heed warning signals of developing problems.

Large scale peace operations require regional organizations, a nation, or a coalition of nations to execute. Operations conducted without consent require military expertise beyond the scope of the UN. In today's world, it is inevitable that these

missions will have to be given to one nation or a coalition of states that have adequate military resources to conduct them.[49]

The UN Role

If the UN is not suited to perform a military role, what is its role in peace operations? The UN's strength and effectiveness have been derived from its traditional lack of vested interest in a problem and its credibility.[50] It has built a reputation of neutrality, which gives it strong credentials in a role as an impartial negotiator and mediator. This strength needs to be applied to develop alternative methods to military solutions. Techniques like mediation, negotiation, and consultation can achieve positive results and be used with the same forethought, planning and training as military operations. The goal is to achieve peace through peaceful means, such as peace building or peacemaking.[51]

A reorientation of the UN effort is required. The UN focus must shift from dealing with conflicts to dealing with the early stages of problems. It needs to achieve greater success against symptoms and causes in order to reduce the requirement to deal with their consequences. This shift requires active engagement by UN personnel at the first sign something is going wrong. The financial impacts of military operations alone dictate this approach. For every dollar of humanitarian assistance the UN was trying to provide to Somalia, ten dollars had to be provided to support the military operation. The humanitarian program only cost $165 million. The military

operation cost was $1.5 billion.[52]

Peace building, the application of non-security programs such as economic development for security purposes, has been proposed as a tool for the UN. The coordination and administration of this type effort appears to be a function the UN is very capable of managing. Peace building fits well between the UN's security agenda and its economic and social agenda.[53]

Constructive containment, a hybrid of George F. Kennan's policy of containment and Chester A. Crocker's policy of constructive engagement, could be a viable international alternative to military intervention. Simply described, this policy utilizes a combination of the carrot and the stick. It offers future opportunities to a country in return for its cooperation, but maintains restraints if cooperation is not forthcoming. The objective of the policy is to bring about the return of backlash and rogue states into the international community.[54]

Humanitarian diplomacy is another option for UN employment. Proponents of this concept believe that in conflicts where different factions are vying for power and territory, the most sensible course of action for the UN is to provide humanitarian assistance in an impartial and non-intrusive manner while undertaking low-key diplomacy. Post-Soviet Afghanistan is cited as an example of how this policy can work. Various Afghan groups were struggling for power. Throughout the country, there were food shortages and displaced populations. The UN was able to

distribute aid impartially based on a needs assessment conducted by UN representatives. By using distribution points in the neighboring countries around Afghanistan, aid addressed the most urgent needs. Early resistance from individual factions was overcome by UN agencies developing relations with local groups. There was no militarization of aid. Humanitarian assistance helped open the peace process between warring factions. Humanitarian diplomacy uses the distribution of assistance as a tool to build bridges between the parties in the conflict.[55]

The UN's role is to bring all of the elements of its power to focus on a peaceful resolution of the problem. Negotiation and mediation are the techniques which have earned it a unique place in the international community. Its reputation has been built on its efforts to foster peaceful settlements of disputes, not its ability to enforce compliance.

Conclusions

The UN faces a peace operation dilemma. The post-Cold War period has been marked with conflict over cultural, ethnic, religious legacies.[56] The international community has failed to achieve peace. The UN Security Council has authorized multiple peace operations to enforce order and terminate what are predominantly intrastate conflicts. The results are mixed and disappointing. Intrastate conflicts pose new and complex challenges to international peace and stability. They are not resolved by traditional peacekeeping methods. The financial costs of peace operations are staggering and are a schism between

member states and the UN.

The UN Secretary-General's initiatives, proposed in 1992 and 1995 to strengthen its peace operation capability, focus on developing a military capability to support the UN. When examined against the UN's organizational structure and competence, this approach is unsound. The UN does not have the facilities, tools or expertise to run military operations. If military action becomes necessary, it should be executed by individual member states or regional organizations.

Intervention in behalf of human rights is questioned by many states. They base their position on Article 2(7) of UN Charter, which recognizes the sovereignty of the state and limits UN intervention in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. Many Third World countries suspect humanitarian intervention is based on ulterior motives. They resist intervention without consent.[57] In part, this reaction is defensive. Many states realize they face greater threats from their own societies than they do from external neighbors.

The impulse to engage in peace operations under the UN flag is waning and there is a move toward conflict avoidance.[58] Many countries are beginning to realize that military force is not the answer to the complex political, ethnic, social and economic crises which have beset the post-Cold War world.[59] In the early years of the post-Cold War period, there was a tendency to reach for military solutions to problems. Today, other methods are being examined.

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The UN's strength is its impartiality and credibility. Its core competency has been peace negotiation and mediation. It must continue to use that competency against emerging problems. It needs to give more emphasis to preventive strategies for handling intrastate conflict.[60] It makes more sense for the UN to concentrate its efforts on peace building and other preventive strategies than on peace restoration.[61]

The UN's role is to exhaust every available option before engaging in a military solution. Military peacekeeping operations have changed. As Alex Morrision of the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies describes, "Today's peacekeeping is not playing with toys in a sandbox. It's what our men and women in uniform would surely call war."[62] The UN's role is to preclude these wars from occurring, not to wage them.

ENDNOTES

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[2]The term peace operation will be used in this paper to address the entire spectrum of activities ranging from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

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[4]Ibid., Section 44.

[5]Ibid., Sections 53 and 54.

[6]Ibid., Section 73.

[7]United Nations, Secretariat, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, 3 January 1995, Sections 43 and 44.

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[31]Ibid.

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[34]Ibid.

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[36]Ibid.

[37]Duke, 387-389.

[38]Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework of Analysis'" Review of International Studies, (October 1995): 360.

[39]Ibid., 359.

[40]Ibid., 360-361.

[41]Michael Barnett, "Partners in peace? The UN, regional organizations, and peace-keeping," Review of International Studies, (October 1995): 420.

[42]Ibid., 420.

[43]Barnett's article refers to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This name is incorrect. The organization was redesignated the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe on 1 January 1995. The correct name is substituted.

[44]Barnett, 420.

[45]Ibid., 420, 423-424.

[46]Ibid., 424.

[47]Orn, 4.

[48]Orn, 4-5.

[49]Ibid., 4.

[50]Giandomenico Picco, "The UN and the Use of Force," Foreign Affairs, (September/October 1994): 14-18.

[51]Fetherston, 16.

[52]Eliasson, 101-104.

[53]Evans, 13.

[54]Alan K. Henrikson, "Constructive Containment," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 19, (Summer/Fall 1995): 14.

[55]Antonio Donini, "Beyond Neutrality: On the Compatibility of Military Intervention and Humanitarian Assistance," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 19, (Summer/Fall 1995): 40-41.

[56]Ibid., 44.

[57]Orn, 3.

[58]Henrikson, 1.

[59]Donini, 37-38.

[60]Evans, 3.

[61]Evans, 11.

[62]Wayne C. Thompson, <u>Canada 1995</u>, (Harpers Ferry, WV: Stryker Post Publications), <u>114.</u>

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